package org.bouncycastle.crypto.agreement.jpake;

import java.math.BigInteger;
import java.security.SecureRandom;

import org.bouncycastle.crypto.CryptoException;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.CryptoServicesRegistrar;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.Digest;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.digests.SHA256Digest;
import org.bouncycastle.util.Arrays;

A participant in a Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE) exchange.

The J-PAKE exchange is defined by Feng Hao and Peter Ryan in the paper "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling, 2008."

The J-PAKE protocol is symmetric. There is no notion of a client or server, but rather just two participants. An instance of JPAKEParticipant represents one participant, and is the primary interface for executing the exchange.

To execute an exchange, construct a JPAKEParticipant on each end, and call the following 7 methods (once and only once, in the given order, for each participant, sending messages between them as described):

  1. createRound1PayloadToSend() - and send the payload to the other participant
  2. validateRound1PayloadReceived(JPAKERound1Payload) - use the payload received from the other participant
  3. createRound2PayloadToSend() - and send the payload to the other participant
  4. validateRound2PayloadReceived(JPAKERound2Payload) - use the payload received from the other participant
  5. calculateKeyingMaterial()
  6. createRound3PayloadToSend(BigInteger) - and send the payload to the other participant
  7. validateRound3PayloadReceived(JPAKERound3Payload, BigInteger) - use the payload received from the other participant

Each side should derive a session key from the keying material returned by calculateKeyingMaterial(). The caller is responsible for deriving the session key using a secure key derivation function (KDF).

Round 3 is an optional key confirmation process. If you do not execute round 3, then there is no assurance that both participants are using the same key. (i.e. if the participants used different passwords, then their session keys will differ.)

If the round 3 validation succeeds, then the keys are guaranteed to be the same on both sides.

The symmetric design can easily support the asymmetric cases when one party initiates the communication. e.g. Sometimes the round1 payload and round2 payload may be sent in one pass. Also, in some cases, the key confirmation payload can be sent together with the round2 payload. These are the trivial techniques to optimize the communication.

The key confirmation process is implemented as specified in NIST SP 800-56A Revision 1, Section 8.2 Unilateral Key Confirmation for Key Agreement Schemes.

This class is stateful and NOT threadsafe. Each instance should only be used for ONE complete J-PAKE exchange (i.e. a new JPAKEParticipant should be constructed for each new J-PAKE exchange).

/** * A participant in a Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE) exchange. * <p> * The J-PAKE exchange is defined by Feng Hao and Peter Ryan in the paper * <a href="http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf"> * "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling, 2008."</a> * <p> * The J-PAKE protocol is symmetric. * There is no notion of a <i>client</i> or <i>server</i>, but rather just two <i>participants</i>. * An instance of {@link JPAKEParticipant} represents one participant, and * is the primary interface for executing the exchange. * <p> * To execute an exchange, construct a {@link JPAKEParticipant} on each end, * and call the following 7 methods * (once and only once, in the given order, for each participant, sending messages between them as described): * <ol> * <li>{@link #createRound1PayloadToSend()} - and send the payload to the other participant</li> * <li>{@link #validateRound1PayloadReceived(JPAKERound1Payload)} - use the payload received from the other participant</li> * <li>{@link #createRound2PayloadToSend()} - and send the payload to the other participant</li> * <li>{@link #validateRound2PayloadReceived(JPAKERound2Payload)} - use the payload received from the other participant</li> * <li>{@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}</li> * <li>{@link #createRound3PayloadToSend(BigInteger)} - and send the payload to the other participant</li> * <li>{@link #validateRound3PayloadReceived(JPAKERound3Payload, BigInteger)} - use the payload received from the other participant</li> * </ol> * <p> * Each side should derive a session key from the keying material returned by {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}. * The caller is responsible for deriving the session key using a secure key derivation function (KDF). * <p> * Round 3 is an optional key confirmation process. * If you do not execute round 3, then there is no assurance that both participants are using the same key. * (i.e. if the participants used different passwords, then their session keys will differ.) * <p> * If the round 3 validation succeeds, then the keys are guaranteed to be the same on both sides. * <p> * The symmetric design can easily support the asymmetric cases when one party initiates the communication. * e.g. Sometimes the round1 payload and round2 payload may be sent in one pass. * Also, in some cases, the key confirmation payload can be sent together with the round2 payload. * These are the trivial techniques to optimize the communication. * <p> * The key confirmation process is implemented as specified in * <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800-56A_Revision1_Mar08-2007.pdf">NIST SP 800-56A Revision 1</a>, * Section 8.2 Unilateral Key Confirmation for Key Agreement Schemes. * <p> * This class is stateful and NOT threadsafe. * Each instance should only be used for ONE complete J-PAKE exchange * (i.e. a new {@link JPAKEParticipant} should be constructed for each new J-PAKE exchange). * <p> */
public class JPAKEParticipant { /* * Possible internal states. Used for state checking. */ public static final int STATE_INITIALIZED = 0; public static final int STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED = 10; public static final int STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED = 20; public static final int STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED = 30; public static final int STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED = 40; public static final int STATE_KEY_CALCULATED = 50; public static final int STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED = 60; public static final int STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED = 70;
Unique identifier of this participant. The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id.
/** * Unique identifier of this participant. * The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id. */
private final String participantId;
Shared secret. This only contains the secret between construction and the call to calculateKeyingMaterial().

i.e. When calculateKeyingMaterial() is called, this buffer overwritten with 0's, and the field is set to null.

/** * Shared secret. This only contains the secret between construction * and the call to {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}. * <p> * i.e. When {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()} is called, this buffer overwritten with 0's, * and the field is set to null. * </p> */
private char[] password;
Digest to use during calculations.
/** * Digest to use during calculations. */
private final Digest digest;
Source of secure random data.
/** * Source of secure random data. */
private final SecureRandom random; private final BigInteger p; private final BigInteger q; private final BigInteger g;
The participantId of the other participant in this exchange.
/** * The participantId of the other participant in this exchange. */
private String partnerParticipantId;
Alice's x1 or Bob's x3.
/** * Alice's x1 or Bob's x3. */
private BigInteger x1;
Alice's x2 or Bob's x4.
/** * Alice's x2 or Bob's x4. */
private BigInteger x2;
Alice's g^x1 or Bob's g^x3.
/** * Alice's g^x1 or Bob's g^x3. */
private BigInteger gx1;
Alice's g^x2 or Bob's g^x4.
/** * Alice's g^x2 or Bob's g^x4. */
private BigInteger gx2;
Alice's g^x3 or Bob's g^x1.
/** * Alice's g^x3 or Bob's g^x1. */
private BigInteger gx3;
Alice's g^x4 or Bob's g^x2.
/** * Alice's g^x4 or Bob's g^x2. */
private BigInteger gx4;
Alice's B or Bob's A.
/** * Alice's B or Bob's A. */
private BigInteger b;
The current state. See the STATE_* constants for possible values.
/** * The current state. * See the <tt>STATE_*</tt> constants for possible values. */
private int state;
Convenience constructor for a new JPAKEParticipant that uses the JPAKEPrimeOrderGroups.NIST_3072 prime order group, a SHA-256 digest, and a default SecureRandom implementation.

After construction, the state will be STATE_INITIALIZED.

Params:
  • participantId – unique identifier of this participant. The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id.
  • password – shared secret. A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once calculateKeyingMaterial() is called). Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible.
Throws:
/** * Convenience constructor for a new {@link JPAKEParticipant} that uses * the {@link JPAKEPrimeOrderGroups#NIST_3072} prime order group, * a SHA-256 digest, and a default {@link SecureRandom} implementation. * <p> * After construction, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_INITIALIZED}. * * @param participantId unique identifier of this participant. * The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id. * @param password shared secret. * A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()} is called). * Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible. * @throws NullPointerException if any argument is null * @throws IllegalArgumentException if password is empty */
public JPAKEParticipant( String participantId, char[] password) { this( participantId, password, JPAKEPrimeOrderGroups.NIST_3072); }
Convenience constructor for a new JPAKEParticipant that uses a SHA-256 digest and a default SecureRandom implementation.

After construction, the state will be STATE_INITIALIZED.

Params:
  • participantId – unique identifier of this participant. The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id.
  • password – shared secret. A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once calculateKeyingMaterial() is called). Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible.
  • group – prime order group. See JPAKEPrimeOrderGroups for standard groups
Throws:
/** * Convenience constructor for a new {@link JPAKEParticipant} that uses * a SHA-256 digest and a default {@link SecureRandom} implementation. * <p> * After construction, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_INITIALIZED}. * * @param participantId unique identifier of this participant. * The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id. * @param password shared secret. * A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()} is called). * Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible. * @param group prime order group. * See {@link JPAKEPrimeOrderGroups} for standard groups * @throws NullPointerException if any argument is null * @throws IllegalArgumentException if password is empty */
public JPAKEParticipant( String participantId, char[] password, JPAKEPrimeOrderGroup group) { this( participantId, password, group, new SHA256Digest(), CryptoServicesRegistrar.getSecureRandom()); }
Construct a new JPAKEParticipant.

After construction, the state will be STATE_INITIALIZED.

Params:
  • participantId – unique identifier of this participant. The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id.
  • password – shared secret. A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once calculateKeyingMaterial() is called). Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible.
  • group – prime order group. See JPAKEPrimeOrderGroups for standard groups
  • digest – digest to use during zero knowledge proofs and key confirmation (SHA-256 or stronger preferred)
  • random – source of secure random data for x1 and x2, and for the zero knowledge proofs
Throws:
/** * Construct a new {@link JPAKEParticipant}. * <p> * After construction, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_INITIALIZED}. * * @param participantId unique identifier of this participant. * The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id. * @param password shared secret. * A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()} is called). * Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible. * @param group prime order group. * See {@link JPAKEPrimeOrderGroups} for standard groups * @param digest digest to use during zero knowledge proofs and key confirmation (SHA-256 or stronger preferred) * @param random source of secure random data for x1 and x2, and for the zero knowledge proofs * @throws NullPointerException if any argument is null * @throws IllegalArgumentException if password is empty */
public JPAKEParticipant( String participantId, char[] password, JPAKEPrimeOrderGroup group, Digest digest, SecureRandom random) { JPAKEUtil.validateNotNull(participantId, "participantId"); JPAKEUtil.validateNotNull(password, "password"); JPAKEUtil.validateNotNull(group, "p"); JPAKEUtil.validateNotNull(digest, "digest"); JPAKEUtil.validateNotNull(random, "random"); if (password.length == 0) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Password must not be empty."); } this.participantId = participantId; /* * Create a defensive copy so as to fully encapsulate the password. * * This array will contain the password for the lifetime of this * participant BEFORE {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()} is called. * * i.e. When {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()} is called, the array will be cleared * in order to remove the password from memory. * * The caller is responsible for clearing the original password array * given as input to this constructor. */ this.password = Arrays.copyOf(password, password.length); this.p = group.getP(); this.q = group.getQ(); this.g = group.getG(); this.digest = digest; this.random = random; this.state = STATE_INITIALIZED; }
Gets the current state of this participant. See the STATE_* constants for possible values.
/** * Gets the current state of this participant. * See the <tt>STATE_*</tt> constants for possible values. */
public int getState() { return this.state; }
Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 1.

After execution, the state will be STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED.

/** * Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 1. * <p> * After execution, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED}. */
public JPAKERound1Payload createRound1PayloadToSend() { if (this.state >= STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Round1 payload already created for " + participantId); } this.x1 = JPAKEUtil.generateX1(q, random); this.x2 = JPAKEUtil.generateX2(q, random); this.gx1 = JPAKEUtil.calculateGx(p, g, x1); this.gx2 = JPAKEUtil.calculateGx(p, g, x2); BigInteger[] knowledgeProofForX1 = JPAKEUtil.calculateZeroKnowledgeProof(p, q, g, gx1, x1, participantId, digest, random); BigInteger[] knowledgeProofForX2 = JPAKEUtil.calculateZeroKnowledgeProof(p, q, g, gx2, x2, participantId, digest, random); this.state = STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED; return new JPAKERound1Payload(participantId, gx1, gx2, knowledgeProofForX1, knowledgeProofForX2); }
Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 1.

Must be called prior to createRound2PayloadToSend().

After execution, the state will be STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED.

Throws:
/** * Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 1. * <p> * Must be called prior to {@link #createRound2PayloadToSend()}. * <p> * After execution, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED}. * * @throws CryptoException if validation fails. * @throws IllegalStateException if called multiple times. */
public void validateRound1PayloadReceived(JPAKERound1Payload round1PayloadReceived) throws CryptoException { if (this.state >= STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Validation already attempted for round1 payload for" + participantId); } this.partnerParticipantId = round1PayloadReceived.getParticipantId(); this.gx3 = round1PayloadReceived.getGx1(); this.gx4 = round1PayloadReceived.getGx2(); BigInteger[] knowledgeProofForX3 = round1PayloadReceived.getKnowledgeProofForX1(); BigInteger[] knowledgeProofForX4 = round1PayloadReceived.getKnowledgeProofForX2(); JPAKEUtil.validateParticipantIdsDiffer(participantId, round1PayloadReceived.getParticipantId()); JPAKEUtil.validateGx4(gx4); JPAKEUtil.validateZeroKnowledgeProof(p, q, g, gx3, knowledgeProofForX3, round1PayloadReceived.getParticipantId(), digest); JPAKEUtil.validateZeroKnowledgeProof(p, q, g, gx4, knowledgeProofForX4, round1PayloadReceived.getParticipantId(), digest); this.state = STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED; }
Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 2.

validateRound1PayloadReceived(JPAKERound1Payload) must be called prior to this method.

After execution, the state will be STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED.

Throws:
/** * Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 2. * <p> * {@link #validateRound1PayloadReceived(JPAKERound1Payload)} must be called prior to this method. * <p> * After execution, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED}. * * @throws IllegalStateException if called prior to {@link #validateRound1PayloadReceived(JPAKERound1Payload)}, or multiple times */
public JPAKERound2Payload createRound2PayloadToSend() { if (this.state >= STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Round2 payload already created for " + this.participantId); } if (this.state < STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Round1 payload must be validated prior to creating Round2 payload for " + this.participantId); } BigInteger gA = JPAKEUtil.calculateGA(p, gx1, gx3, gx4); BigInteger s = JPAKEUtil.calculateS(password); BigInteger x2s = JPAKEUtil.calculateX2s(q, x2, s); BigInteger A = JPAKEUtil.calculateA(p, q, gA, x2s); BigInteger[] knowledgeProofForX2s = JPAKEUtil.calculateZeroKnowledgeProof(p, q, gA, A, x2s, participantId, digest, random); this.state = STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED; return new JPAKERound2Payload(participantId, A, knowledgeProofForX2s); }
Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 2.

Note that this DOES NOT detect a non-common password. The only indication of a non-common password is through derivation of different keys (which can be detected explicitly by executing round 3 and round 4)

Must be called prior to calculateKeyingMaterial().

After execution, the state will be STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED.

Throws:
/** * Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 2. * <p> * Note that this DOES NOT detect a non-common password. * The only indication of a non-common password is through derivation * of different keys (which can be detected explicitly by executing round 3 and round 4) * <p> * Must be called prior to {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}. * <p> * After execution, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED}. * * @throws CryptoException if validation fails. * @throws IllegalStateException if called prior to {@link #validateRound1PayloadReceived(JPAKERound1Payload)}, or multiple times */
public void validateRound2PayloadReceived(JPAKERound2Payload round2PayloadReceived) throws CryptoException { if (this.state >= STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Validation already attempted for round2 payload for" + participantId); } if (this.state < STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Round1 payload must be validated prior to validating Round2 payload for " + this.participantId); } BigInteger gB = JPAKEUtil.calculateGA(p, gx3, gx1, gx2); this.b = round2PayloadReceived.getA(); BigInteger[] knowledgeProofForX4s = round2PayloadReceived.getKnowledgeProofForX2s(); JPAKEUtil.validateParticipantIdsDiffer(participantId, round2PayloadReceived.getParticipantId()); JPAKEUtil.validateParticipantIdsEqual(this.partnerParticipantId, round2PayloadReceived.getParticipantId()); JPAKEUtil.validateGa(gB); JPAKEUtil.validateZeroKnowledgeProof(p, q, gB, b, knowledgeProofForX4s, round2PayloadReceived.getParticipantId(), digest); this.state = STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED; }
Calculates and returns the key material. A session key must be derived from this key material using a secure key derivation function (KDF). The KDF used to derive the key is handled externally (i.e. not by JPAKEParticipant).

The keying material will be identical for each participant if and only if each participant's password is the same. i.e. If the participants do not share the same password, then each participant will derive a different key. Therefore, if you immediately start using a key derived from the keying material, then you must handle detection of incorrect keys. If you want to handle this detection explicitly, you can optionally perform rounds 3 and 4. See JPAKEParticipant for details on how to execute rounds 3 and 4.

The keying material will be in the range [0, p-1].

validateRound2PayloadReceived(JPAKERound2Payload) must be called prior to this method.

As a side effect, the internal password array is cleared, since it is no longer needed.

After execution, the state will be STATE_KEY_CALCULATED.

Throws:
/** * Calculates and returns the key material. * A session key must be derived from this key material using a secure key derivation function (KDF). * The KDF used to derive the key is handled externally (i.e. not by {@link JPAKEParticipant}). * <p> * The keying material will be identical for each participant if and only if * each participant's password is the same. i.e. If the participants do not * share the same password, then each participant will derive a different key. * Therefore, if you immediately start using a key derived from * the keying material, then you must handle detection of incorrect keys. * If you want to handle this detection explicitly, you can optionally perform * rounds 3 and 4. See {@link JPAKEParticipant} for details on how to execute * rounds 3 and 4. * <p> * The keying material will be in the range <tt>[0, p-1]</tt>. * <p> * {@link #validateRound2PayloadReceived(JPAKERound2Payload)} must be called prior to this method. * <p> * As a side effect, the internal {@link #password} array is cleared, since it is no longer needed. * <p> * After execution, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_KEY_CALCULATED}. * * @throws IllegalStateException if called prior to {@link #validateRound2PayloadReceived(JPAKERound2Payload)}, * or if called multiple times. */
public BigInteger calculateKeyingMaterial() { if (this.state >= STATE_KEY_CALCULATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Key already calculated for " + participantId); } if (this.state < STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Round2 payload must be validated prior to creating key for " + participantId); } BigInteger s = JPAKEUtil.calculateS(password); /* * Clear the password array from memory, since we don't need it anymore. * * Also set the field to null as a flag to indicate that the key has already been calculated. */ Arrays.fill(password, (char)0); this.password = null; BigInteger keyingMaterial = JPAKEUtil.calculateKeyingMaterial(p, q, gx4, x2, s, b); /* * Clear the ephemeral private key fields as well. * Note that we're relying on the garbage collector to do its job to clean these up. * The old objects will hang around in memory until the garbage collector destroys them. * * If the ephemeral private keys x1 and x2 are leaked, * the attacker might be able to brute-force the password. */ this.x1 = null; this.x2 = null; this.b = null; /* * Do not clear gx* yet, since those are needed by round 3. */ this.state = STATE_KEY_CALCULATED; return keyingMaterial; }
Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 3.

See JPAKEParticipant for more details on round 3.

After execution, the state will be STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED.

Params:
Throws:
/** * Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 3. * <p> * See {@link JPAKEParticipant} for more details on round 3. * <p> * After execution, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED}. * * @param keyingMaterial The keying material as returned from {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}. * @throws IllegalStateException if called prior to {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}, or multiple times */
public JPAKERound3Payload createRound3PayloadToSend(BigInteger keyingMaterial) { if (this.state >= STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Round3 payload already created for " + this.participantId); } if (this.state < STATE_KEY_CALCULATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Keying material must be calculated prior to creating Round3 payload for " + this.participantId); } BigInteger macTag = JPAKEUtil.calculateMacTag( this.participantId, this.partnerParticipantId, this.gx1, this.gx2, this.gx3, this.gx4, keyingMaterial, this.digest); this.state = STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED; return new JPAKERound3Payload(participantId, macTag); }
Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 3.

See JPAKEParticipant for more details on round 3.

After execution, the state will be STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED.

Params:
  • round3PayloadReceived – The round 3 payload received from the other participant.
  • keyingMaterial – The keying material as returned from calculateKeyingMaterial().
Throws:
/** * Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 3. * <p> * See {@link JPAKEParticipant} for more details on round 3. * <p> * After execution, the {@link #getState() state} will be {@link #STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED}. * * @param round3PayloadReceived The round 3 payload received from the other participant. * @param keyingMaterial The keying material as returned from {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}. * @throws CryptoException if validation fails. * @throws IllegalStateException if called prior to {@link #calculateKeyingMaterial()}, or multiple times */
public void validateRound3PayloadReceived(JPAKERound3Payload round3PayloadReceived, BigInteger keyingMaterial) throws CryptoException { if (this.state >= STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Validation already attempted for round3 payload for" + participantId); } if (this.state < STATE_KEY_CALCULATED) { throw new IllegalStateException("Keying material must be calculated validated prior to validating Round3 payload for " + this.participantId); } JPAKEUtil.validateParticipantIdsDiffer(participantId, round3PayloadReceived.getParticipantId()); JPAKEUtil.validateParticipantIdsEqual(this.partnerParticipantId, round3PayloadReceived.getParticipantId()); JPAKEUtil.validateMacTag( this.participantId, this.partnerParticipantId, this.gx1, this.gx2, this.gx3, this.gx4, keyingMaterial, this.digest, round3PayloadReceived.getMacTag()); /* * Clear the rest of the fields. */ this.gx1 = null; this.gx2 = null; this.gx3 = null; this.gx4 = null; this.state = STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED; } }