/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as
* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this
* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided
* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code.
*
* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that
* accompanied this code).
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version
* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*
* Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA
* or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any
* questions.
*/
package com.sun.security.sasl.gsskerb;
import javax.security.sasl.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.logging.Level;
// JAAS
import javax.security.auth.callback.*;
// JGSS
import org.ietf.jgss.*;
Implements the GSSAPI SASL server mechanism for Kerberos V5.
(RFC 2222,
draft-ietf-cat-sasl-gssapi-00.txt).
Expects thread's Subject to contain server's Kerberos credentials
- If not, underlying KRB5 mech will attempt to acquire Kerberos creds
by logging into Kerberos (via default TextCallbackHandler).
- These creds will be used for exchange with client.
Required callbacks:
- AuthorizeCallback
handler must verify that authid/authzids are allowed and set
authorized ID to be the canonicalized authzid (if applicable).
Environment properties that affect behavior of implementation:
javax.security.sasl.qop
- quality of protection; list of auth, auth-int, auth-conf; default is "auth"
javax.security.sasl.maxbuf
- max receive buffer size; default is 65536
javax.security.sasl.sendmaxbuffer
- max send buffer size; default is 65536; (min with client max recv size)
Author: Rosanna Lee
/**
* Implements the GSSAPI SASL server mechanism for Kerberos V5.
* (<A HREF="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2222.txt">RFC 2222</A>,
* <a HREF="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-cat-sasl-gssapi-00.txt">draft-ietf-cat-sasl-gssapi-00.txt</a>).
*
* Expects thread's Subject to contain server's Kerberos credentials
* - If not, underlying KRB5 mech will attempt to acquire Kerberos creds
* by logging into Kerberos (via default TextCallbackHandler).
* - These creds will be used for exchange with client.
*
* Required callbacks:
* - AuthorizeCallback
* handler must verify that authid/authzids are allowed and set
* authorized ID to be the canonicalized authzid (if applicable).
*
* Environment properties that affect behavior of implementation:
*
* javax.security.sasl.qop
* - quality of protection; list of auth, auth-int, auth-conf; default is "auth"
* javax.security.sasl.maxbuf
* - max receive buffer size; default is 65536
* javax.security.sasl.sendmaxbuffer
* - max send buffer size; default is 65536; (min with client max recv size)
*
* @author Rosanna Lee
*/
final class GssKrb5Server extends GssKrb5Base implements SaslServer {
private static final String MY_CLASS_NAME = GssKrb5Server.class.getName();
private int handshakeStage = 0;
private String peer;
private String authzid;
private CallbackHandler cbh;
Creates a SASL mechanism with server credentials that it needs
to participate in GSS-API/Kerberos v5 authentication exchange
with the client.
/**
* Creates a SASL mechanism with server credentials that it needs
* to participate in GSS-API/Kerberos v5 authentication exchange
* with the client.
*/
GssKrb5Server(String protocol, String serverName,
Map<String, ?> props, CallbackHandler cbh) throws SaslException {
super(props, MY_CLASS_NAME);
this.cbh = cbh;
String service = protocol + "@" + serverName;
logger.log(Level.FINE, "KRB5SRV01:Using service name: {0}", service);
try {
GSSManager mgr = GSSManager.getInstance();
// Create the name for the requested service entity for Krb5 mech
GSSName serviceName = mgr.createName(service,
GSSName.NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, KRB5_OID);
GSSCredential cred = mgr.createCredential(serviceName,
GSSCredential.INDEFINITE_LIFETIME,
KRB5_OID, GSSCredential.ACCEPT_ONLY);
// Create a context using the server's credentials
secCtx = mgr.createContext(cred);
if ((allQop&INTEGRITY_ONLY_PROTECTION) != 0) {
// Might need integrity
secCtx.requestInteg(true);
}
if ((allQop&PRIVACY_PROTECTION) != 0) {
// Might need privacy
secCtx.requestConf(true);
}
} catch (GSSException e) {
throw new SaslException("Failure to initialize security context", e);
}
logger.log(Level.FINE, "KRB5SRV02:Initialization complete");
}
Processes the response data.
The client sends response data to which the server must
process using GSS_accept_sec_context.
As per RFC 2222, the GSS authenication completes (GSS_S_COMPLETE)
we do an extra hand shake to determine the negotiated security protection
and buffer sizes.
Params: - responseData – A non-null but possible empty byte array containing the
response data from the client.
Returns: A non-null byte array containing the challenge to be
sent to the client, or null when no more data is to be sent.
/**
* Processes the response data.
*
* The client sends response data to which the server must
* process using GSS_accept_sec_context.
* As per RFC 2222, the GSS authenication completes (GSS_S_COMPLETE)
* we do an extra hand shake to determine the negotiated security protection
* and buffer sizes.
*
* @param responseData A non-null but possible empty byte array containing the
* response data from the client.
* @return A non-null byte array containing the challenge to be
* sent to the client, or null when no more data is to be sent.
*/
public byte[] evaluateResponse(byte[] responseData) throws SaslException {
if (completed) {
throw new SaslException(
"SASL authentication already complete");
}
if (logger.isLoggable(Level.FINER)) {
traceOutput(MY_CLASS_NAME, "evaluateResponse",
"KRB5SRV03:Response [raw]:", responseData);
}
switch (handshakeStage) {
case 1:
return doHandshake1(responseData);
case 2:
return doHandshake2(responseData);
default:
// Security context not established yet; continue with accept
try {
byte[] gssOutToken = secCtx.acceptSecContext(responseData,
0, responseData.length);
if (logger.isLoggable(Level.FINER)) {
traceOutput(MY_CLASS_NAME, "evaluateResponse",
"KRB5SRV04:Challenge: [after acceptSecCtx]", gssOutToken);
}
if (secCtx.isEstablished()) {
handshakeStage = 1;
peer = secCtx.getSrcName().toString();
logger.log(Level.FINE, "KRB5SRV05:Peer name is : {0}", peer);
if (gssOutToken == null) {
return doHandshake1(EMPTY);
}
}
return gssOutToken;
} catch (GSSException e) {
throw new SaslException("GSS initiate failed", e);
}
}
}
private byte[] doHandshake1(byte[] responseData) throws SaslException {
try {
// Security context already established. responseData
// should contain no data
if (responseData != null && responseData.length > 0) {
throw new SaslException(
"Handshake expecting no response data from server");
}
// Construct 4 octets of data:
// First octet contains bitmask specifying protections supported
// 2nd-4th octets contains max receive buffer of server
byte[] gssInToken = new byte[4];
gssInToken[0] = allQop;
intToNetworkByteOrder(recvMaxBufSize, gssInToken, 1, 3);
if (logger.isLoggable(Level.FINE)) {
logger.log(Level.FINE,
"KRB5SRV06:Supported protections: {0}; recv max buf size: {1}",
new Object[]{new Byte(allQop),
new Integer(recvMaxBufSize)});
}
handshakeStage = 2; // progress to next stage
if (logger.isLoggable(Level.FINER)) {
traceOutput(MY_CLASS_NAME, "doHandshake1",
"KRB5SRV07:Challenge [raw]", gssInToken);
}
byte[] gssOutToken = secCtx.wrap(gssInToken, 0, gssInToken.length,
new MessageProp(0 /* gop */, false /* privacy */));
if (logger.isLoggable(Level.FINER)) {
traceOutput(MY_CLASS_NAME, "doHandshake1",
"KRB5SRV08:Challenge [after wrap]", gssOutToken);
}
return gssOutToken;
} catch (GSSException e) {
throw new SaslException("Problem wrapping handshake1", e);
}
}
private byte[] doHandshake2(byte[] responseData) throws SaslException {
try {
// Expecting 4 octets from client selected protection
// and client's receive buffer size
MessageProp msgProp = new MessageProp(false);
byte[] gssOutToken = secCtx.unwrap(responseData, 0,
responseData.length, msgProp);
checkMessageProp("Handshake failure: ", msgProp);
if (logger.isLoggable(Level.FINER)) {
traceOutput(MY_CLASS_NAME, "doHandshake2",
"KRB5SRV09:Response [after unwrap]", gssOutToken);
}
// First octet is a bit-mask specifying the selected protection
byte selectedQop = gssOutToken[0];
if ((selectedQop&allQop) == 0) {
throw new SaslException("Client selected unsupported protection: "
+ selectedQop);
}
if ((selectedQop&PRIVACY_PROTECTION) != 0) {
privacy = true;
integrity = true;
} else if ((selectedQop&INTEGRITY_ONLY_PROTECTION) != 0) {
integrity = true;
}
// 2nd-4th octets specifies maximum buffer size expected by
// client (in network byte order). This is the server's send
// buffer maximum.
int clntMaxBufSize = networkByteOrderToInt(gssOutToken, 1, 3);
// Determine the max send buffer size based on what the
// client is able to receive and our specified max
sendMaxBufSize = (sendMaxBufSize == 0) ? clntMaxBufSize :
Math.min(sendMaxBufSize, clntMaxBufSize);
// Update context to limit size of returned buffer
rawSendSize = secCtx.getWrapSizeLimit(JGSS_QOP, privacy,
sendMaxBufSize);
if (logger.isLoggable(Level.FINE)) {
logger.log(Level.FINE,
"KRB5SRV10:Selected protection: {0}; privacy: {1}; integrity: {2}",
new Object[]{new Byte(selectedQop),
Boolean.valueOf(privacy),
Boolean.valueOf(integrity)});
logger.log(Level.FINE,
"KRB5SRV11:Client max recv size: {0}; server max send size: {1}; rawSendSize: {2}",
new Object[] {new Integer(clntMaxBufSize),
new Integer(sendMaxBufSize),
new Integer(rawSendSize)});
}
// Get authorization identity, if any
if (gssOutToken.length > 4) {
try {
authzid = new String(gssOutToken, 4,
gssOutToken.length - 4, "UTF-8");
} catch (UnsupportedEncodingException uee) {
throw new SaslException ("Cannot decode authzid", uee);
}
} else {
authzid = peer;
}
logger.log(Level.FINE, "KRB5SRV12:Authzid: {0}", authzid);
AuthorizeCallback acb = new AuthorizeCallback(peer, authzid);
// In Kerberos, realm is embedded in peer name
cbh.handle(new Callback[] {acb});
if (acb.isAuthorized()) {
authzid = acb.getAuthorizedID();
completed = true;
} else {
// Authorization failed
throw new SaslException(peer +
" is not authorized to connect as " + authzid);
}
return null;
} catch (GSSException e) {
throw new SaslException("Final handshake step failed", e);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new SaslException("Problem with callback handler", e);
} catch (UnsupportedCallbackException e) {
throw new SaslException("Problem with callback handler", e);
}
}
public String getAuthorizationID() {
if (completed) {
return authzid;
} else {
throw new IllegalStateException("Authentication incomplete");
}
}
}