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package javafx.util;
import java.security.BasicPermission;
This class is for JavaFX permissions. An FXPermission contains a target name but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.
The target name is the name of the JavaFX permission (see below). The naming
convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.
Also, an asterisk can be used to represent all JavaFX permissions.
The following table lists all the possible FXPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
FXPermission Table
Permission Target Name
What the Permission Allows
Risks of Allowing this Permission
accessClipboard
Posting and retrieval of information to and from the system clipboard
This would allow a malicious application to share or read
potentially sensitive or confidential information.
accessWindowList
Accessing the list of all JavaFX Windows
Providing access to the complete list of all JavaFX windows could give
a malicious application the ability to modify a security dialog.
createRobot
Creating JavaFX Robot objects
The JavaFX Robot object allows code to generate native-level
mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow
malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the
display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.
createTransparentWindow
Creating transparent windows
Transparent windows are not limited to a rectangular region that obscures what is underneath the window. This can make it difficult to distinguish parts of the window from other application windows or the platform desktop, and can be used to allow a malicious application to trick a user into entering sensitive data, especially in conjunction with either setWindowAlwaysOnTop or unrestrictedFullScreen.
loadFont
Loading a custom font, either via the loadFont.loadFont method or a jar file containing embedded fonts listed in the jar manifest
Loading a custom font might allow a malicious application to provide a
malformed font. Such a font could crash the application, allowing the
malicious application to take control of the system, if there are any
bugs in the underlying platform font implementation.
modifyFXMLClassLoader
Setting the ClassLoader used to load FXML objects, and removing the
restriction against loading system classes
Allowing an application to set an arbitrary ClassLoader might enable
a malicious application to load classes with elevated permissions. Also
removing the restriction against loading system classes with a null
ClassLoader, might allow the application access to classes they would
otherwise be denied from accessing.
setWindowAlwaysOnTop
Setting the always-on-top property of a window: setAlwaysOnTop.setAlwaysOnTop
The malicious window might make itself look and behave like the platform desktop, so that information entered by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused, especially in conjunction with the createTransparentWindow permission.
unrestrictedFullScreen
Allow unrestricted full-screen access, including keyboard events
and warning banner
This permission allows an application to enter full-screen mode at any time, override the warning banner, and disable the function of the ESC key to exit from full-screen mode. All keyboard input will be delivered to the application while in full-screen mode, rather than being limited to KEY_PRESSED and KEY_RELEASED events for a subset of keys. See setFullScreen.setFullScreen. This could allow a malicious window to look and behave like the platform desktop, so that information entered by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused, especially in conjunction with the createTransparentWindow permission.
See Also: Since: 9
/**
* This class is for JavaFX permissions.
* An {@code FXPermission} contains a target name but
* no actions list; you either have the named permission
* or you don't.
*
* <p>
* The target name is the name of the JavaFX permission (see below). The naming
* convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.
* Also, an asterisk can be used to represent all JavaFX permissions.
* </p>
*
* <p>
* The following table lists all the possible {@code FXPermission}
* target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission
* allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
* </p>
*
* <table border=1>
* <caption>FXPermission Table</caption>
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="col">Permission Target Name</th>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="col">What the Permission Allows</th>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="col">Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">accessClipboard</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Posting and retrieval of information to and from the system clipboard</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">This would allow a malicious application to share or read
* potentially sensitive or confidential information.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">accessWindowList</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Accessing the list of all JavaFX Windows</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Providing access to the complete list of all JavaFX windows could give
* a malicious application the ability to modify a security dialog.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">createRobot</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Creating JavaFX Robot objects</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">The JavaFX Robot object allows code to generate native-level
* mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow
* malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the
* display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">createTransparentWindow</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Creating transparent windows</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Transparent windows are not limited to a rectangular region that
* obscures what is underneath the window.
* This can make it difficult to distinguish parts of the window
* from other application windows or the platform desktop, and can be used
* to allow a malicious application to trick a user into entering
* sensitive data, especially in conjunction with either
* {@code setWindowAlwaysOnTop} or {@code unrestrictedFullScreen}.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">loadFont</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Loading a custom font, either via the
* {@link javafx.scene.text.Font#loadFont} method or a jar file containing
* embedded fonts listed in the jar manifest</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Loading a custom font might allow a malicious application to provide a
* malformed font. Such a font could crash the application, allowing the
* malicious application to take control of the system, if there are any
* bugs in the underlying platform font implementation.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">modifyFXMLClassLoader</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Setting the ClassLoader used to load FXML objects, and removing the
* restriction against loading system classes</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Allowing an application to set an arbitrary ClassLoader might enable
* a malicious application to load classes with elevated permissions. Also
* removing the restriction against loading system classes with a null
* ClassLoader, might allow the application access to classes they would
* otherwise be denied from accessing.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">setWindowAlwaysOnTop</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Setting the always-on-top property of a window:
* {@link javafx.stage.Stage#setAlwaysOnTop}</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">The malicious window might make itself look and behave like the
* platform desktop, so that information entered by the unsuspecting user
* is captured and subsequently misused,
* especially in conjunction with the {@code createTransparentWindow}
* permission.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th style="padding: 5px;" scope="row">unrestrictedFullScreen</th>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">Allow unrestricted full-screen access, including keyboard events
* and warning banner</td>
* <td style="padding: 5px;">This permission allows an application to enter full-screen mode at any
* time, override the warning banner, and disable the function of
* the ESC key to exit from full-screen mode.
* All keyboard input will be delivered to the application while in
* full-screen mode, rather than being limited to KEY_PRESSED and
* KEY_RELEASED events for a subset of keys. See
* {@link javafx.stage.Stage#setFullScreen}.
* This could allow a malicious window to
* look and behave like the platform desktop, so that information entered
* by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused,
* especially in conjunction with the {@code createTransparentWindow}
* permission.</td>
* </tr>
*
* </table>
*
* @see java.security.BasicPermission
* @see java.security.Permission
* @see java.security.Permissions
* @see java.security.PermissionCollection
* @see java.lang.SecurityManager
*
* @since 9
*/
public final class FXPermission extends BasicPermission {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 2890556410764946054L;
Creates a new FXPermission with the specified name. The name is the symbolic name of the FXPermission, such as "accessClipboard", "createTransparentWindow ", etc. An asterisk may be used to indicate all JavaFX permissions. Params: - name – the name of the FXPermission
Throws: - NullPointerException – if
name is null. - IllegalArgumentException – if
name is empty.
/**
* Creates a new {@code FXPermission} with the specified name.
* The name is the symbolic name of the {@code FXPermission},
* such as "accessClipboard", "createTransparentWindow ", etc. An asterisk
* may be used to indicate all JavaFX permissions.
*
* @param name the name of the FXPermission
*
* @throws NullPointerException if {@code name} is {@code null}.
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if {@code name} is empty.
*/
public FXPermission(String name) {
super(name);
}
}