package org.bouncycastle.crypto.tls;

import java.io.IOException;
import java.security.SecureRandom;

import org.bouncycastle.crypto.BlockCipher;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.CipherParameters;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.Digest;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.KeyParameter;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.ParametersWithIV;
import org.bouncycastle.util.Arrays;

A generic TLS 1.0-1.2 / SSLv3 block cipher. This can be used for AES or 3DES for example.
/** * A generic TLS 1.0-1.2 / SSLv3 block cipher. This can be used for AES or 3DES for example. */
public class TlsBlockCipher implements TlsCipher { protected TlsContext context; protected byte[] randomData; protected boolean useExplicitIV; protected boolean encryptThenMAC; protected BlockCipher encryptCipher; protected BlockCipher decryptCipher; protected TlsMac writeMac; protected TlsMac readMac; public TlsMac getWriteMac() { return writeMac; } public TlsMac getReadMac() { return readMac; } public TlsBlockCipher(TlsContext context, BlockCipher clientWriteCipher, BlockCipher serverWriteCipher, Digest clientWriteDigest, Digest serverWriteDigest, int cipherKeySize) throws IOException { this.context = context; this.randomData = new byte[256]; context.getNonceRandomGenerator().nextBytes(randomData); this.useExplicitIV = TlsUtils.isTLSv11(context); this.encryptThenMAC = context.getSecurityParameters().encryptThenMAC; int key_block_size = (2 * cipherKeySize) + clientWriteDigest.getDigestSize() + serverWriteDigest.getDigestSize(); // From TLS 1.1 onwards, block ciphers don't need client_write_IV if (!useExplicitIV) { key_block_size += clientWriteCipher.getBlockSize() + serverWriteCipher.getBlockSize(); } byte[] key_block = TlsUtils.calculateKeyBlock(context, key_block_size); int offset = 0; TlsMac clientWriteMac = new TlsMac(context, clientWriteDigest, key_block, offset, clientWriteDigest.getDigestSize()); offset += clientWriteDigest.getDigestSize(); TlsMac serverWriteMac = new TlsMac(context, serverWriteDigest, key_block, offset, serverWriteDigest.getDigestSize()); offset += serverWriteDigest.getDigestSize(); KeyParameter client_write_key = new KeyParameter(key_block, offset, cipherKeySize); offset += cipherKeySize; KeyParameter server_write_key = new KeyParameter(key_block, offset, cipherKeySize); offset += cipherKeySize; byte[] client_write_IV, server_write_IV; if (useExplicitIV) { client_write_IV = new byte[clientWriteCipher.getBlockSize()]; server_write_IV = new byte[serverWriteCipher.getBlockSize()]; } else { client_write_IV = Arrays.copyOfRange(key_block, offset, offset + clientWriteCipher.getBlockSize()); offset += clientWriteCipher.getBlockSize(); server_write_IV = Arrays.copyOfRange(key_block, offset, offset + serverWriteCipher.getBlockSize()); offset += serverWriteCipher.getBlockSize(); } if (offset != key_block_size) { throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error); } CipherParameters encryptParams, decryptParams; if (context.isServer()) { this.writeMac = serverWriteMac; this.readMac = clientWriteMac; this.encryptCipher = serverWriteCipher; this.decryptCipher = clientWriteCipher; encryptParams = new ParametersWithIV(server_write_key, server_write_IV); decryptParams = new ParametersWithIV(client_write_key, client_write_IV); } else { this.writeMac = clientWriteMac; this.readMac = serverWriteMac; this.encryptCipher = clientWriteCipher; this.decryptCipher = serverWriteCipher; encryptParams = new ParametersWithIV(client_write_key, client_write_IV); decryptParams = new ParametersWithIV(server_write_key, server_write_IV); } this.encryptCipher.init(true, encryptParams); this.decryptCipher.init(false, decryptParams); } public int getPlaintextLimit(int ciphertextLimit) { int blockSize = encryptCipher.getBlockSize(); int macSize = writeMac.getSize(); int plaintextLimit = ciphertextLimit; // An explicit IV consumes 1 block if (useExplicitIV) { plaintextLimit -= blockSize; } // Leave room for the MAC, and require block-alignment if (encryptThenMAC) { plaintextLimit -= macSize; plaintextLimit -= plaintextLimit % blockSize; } else { plaintextLimit -= plaintextLimit % blockSize; plaintextLimit -= macSize; } // Minimum 1 byte of padding --plaintextLimit; return plaintextLimit; } public byte[] encodePlaintext(long seqNo, short type, byte[] plaintext, int offset, int len) { int blockSize = encryptCipher.getBlockSize(); int macSize = writeMac.getSize(); ProtocolVersion version = context.getServerVersion(); int enc_input_length = len; if (!encryptThenMAC) { enc_input_length += macSize; } int padding_length = blockSize - 1 - (enc_input_length % blockSize); /* * Don't use variable-length padding with truncated MACs. * * See "Tag Size Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record Protocol", Paterson, * Ristenpart, Shrimpton. */ if (encryptThenMAC || !context.getSecurityParameters().truncatedHMac) { // TODO[DTLS] Consider supporting in DTLS (without exceeding send limit though) if (!version.isDTLS() && !version.isSSL()) { // Add a random number of extra blocks worth of padding int maxExtraPadBlocks = (255 - padding_length) / blockSize; int actualExtraPadBlocks = chooseExtraPadBlocks(context.getSecureRandom(), maxExtraPadBlocks); padding_length += actualExtraPadBlocks * blockSize; } } int totalSize = len + macSize + padding_length + 1; if (useExplicitIV) { totalSize += blockSize; } byte[] outBuf = new byte[totalSize]; int outOff = 0; if (useExplicitIV) { byte[] explicitIV = new byte[blockSize]; context.getNonceRandomGenerator().nextBytes(explicitIV); encryptCipher.init(true, new ParametersWithIV(null, explicitIV)); System.arraycopy(explicitIV, 0, outBuf, outOff, blockSize); outOff += blockSize; } int blocks_start = outOff; System.arraycopy(plaintext, offset, outBuf, outOff, len); outOff += len; if (!encryptThenMAC) { byte[] mac = writeMac.calculateMac(seqNo, type, plaintext, offset, len); System.arraycopy(mac, 0, outBuf, outOff, mac.length); outOff += mac.length; } for (int i = 0; i <= padding_length; i++) { outBuf[outOff++] = (byte)padding_length; } for (int i = blocks_start; i < outOff; i += blockSize) { encryptCipher.processBlock(outBuf, i, outBuf, i); } if (encryptThenMAC) { byte[] mac = writeMac.calculateMac(seqNo, type, outBuf, 0, outOff); System.arraycopy(mac, 0, outBuf, outOff, mac.length); outOff += mac.length; } // assert outBuf.length == outOff; return outBuf; } public byte[] decodeCiphertext(long seqNo, short type, byte[] ciphertext, int offset, int len) throws IOException { int blockSize = decryptCipher.getBlockSize(); int macSize = readMac.getSize(); int minLen = blockSize; if (encryptThenMAC) { minLen += macSize; } else { minLen = Math.max(minLen, macSize + 1); } if (useExplicitIV) { minLen += blockSize; } if (len < minLen) { throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decode_error); } int blocks_length = len; if (encryptThenMAC) { blocks_length -= macSize; } if (blocks_length % blockSize != 0) { throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.decryption_failed); } if (encryptThenMAC) { int end = offset + len; byte[] receivedMac = Arrays.copyOfRange(ciphertext, end - macSize, end); byte[] calculatedMac = readMac.calculateMac(seqNo, type, ciphertext, offset, len - macSize); boolean badMac = !Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(calculatedMac, receivedMac); if (badMac) { /* * RFC 7366 3. The MAC SHALL be evaluated before any further processing such as * decryption is performed, and if the MAC verification fails, then processing SHALL * terminate immediately. For TLS, a fatal bad_record_mac MUST be generated [2]. For * DTLS, the record MUST be discarded, and a fatal bad_record_mac MAY be generated * [4]. This immediate response to a bad MAC eliminates any timing channels that may * be available through the use of manipulated packet data. */ throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.bad_record_mac); } } if (useExplicitIV) { decryptCipher.init(false, new ParametersWithIV(null, ciphertext, offset, blockSize)); offset += blockSize; blocks_length -= blockSize; } for (int i = 0; i < blocks_length; i += blockSize) { decryptCipher.processBlock(ciphertext, offset + i, ciphertext, offset + i); } // If there's anything wrong with the padding, this will return zero int totalPad = checkPaddingConstantTime(ciphertext, offset, blocks_length, blockSize, encryptThenMAC ? 0 : macSize); boolean badMac = (totalPad == 0); int dec_output_length = blocks_length - totalPad; if (!encryptThenMAC) { dec_output_length -= macSize; int macInputLen = dec_output_length; int macOff = offset + macInputLen; byte[] receivedMac = Arrays.copyOfRange(ciphertext, macOff, macOff + macSize); byte[] calculatedMac = readMac.calculateMacConstantTime(seqNo, type, ciphertext, offset, macInputLen, blocks_length - macSize, randomData); badMac |= !Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(calculatedMac, receivedMac); } if (badMac) { throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.bad_record_mac); } return Arrays.copyOfRange(ciphertext, offset, offset + dec_output_length); } protected int checkPaddingConstantTime(byte[] buf, int off, int len, int blockSize, int macSize) { int end = off + len; byte lastByte = buf[end - 1]; int padlen = lastByte & 0xff; int totalPad = padlen + 1; int dummyIndex = 0; byte padDiff = 0; if ((TlsUtils.isSSL(context) && totalPad > blockSize) || (macSize + totalPad > len)) { totalPad = 0; } else { int padPos = end - totalPad; do { padDiff |= (buf[padPos++] ^ lastByte); } while (padPos < end); dummyIndex = totalPad; if (padDiff != 0) { totalPad = 0; } } // Run some extra dummy checks so the number of checks is always constant { byte[] dummyPad = randomData; while (dummyIndex < 256) { padDiff |= (dummyPad[dummyIndex++] ^ lastByte); } // Ensure the above loop is not eliminated dummyPad[0] ^= padDiff; } return totalPad; } protected int chooseExtraPadBlocks(SecureRandom r, int max) { // return r.nextInt(max + 1); int x = r.nextInt(); int n = lowestBitSet(x); return Math.min(n, max); } protected int lowestBitSet(int x) { if (x == 0) { return 32; } int n = 0; while ((x & 1) == 0) { ++n; x >>= 1; } return n; } }