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package sun.security.provider.certpath;

import java.io.IOException;
import java.security.PublicKey;
import java.security.cert.CertificateException;
import java.security.cert.CertPathValidatorException;
import java.security.cert.PKIXCertPathChecker;
import java.security.cert.TrustAnchor;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.ListIterator;
import java.util.Set;
import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal;

import sun.security.provider.certpath.PKIX.BuilderParams;
import sun.security.util.Debug;
import sun.security.x509.NameConstraintsExtension;
import sun.security.x509.SubjectKeyIdentifierExtension;
import sun.security.x509.X509CertImpl;

A specification of a reverse PKIX validation state which is initialized by each build and updated each time a certificate is added to the current path.
Author: Sean Mullan, Yassir Elley
Since: 1.4
/** * A specification of a reverse PKIX validation state * which is initialized by each build and updated each time a * certificate is added to the current path. * @since 1.4 * @author Sean Mullan * @author Yassir Elley */
class ReverseState implements State { private static final Debug debug = Debug.getInstance("certpath"); /* The subject DN of the last cert in the path */ X500Principal subjectDN; /* The subject public key of the last cert */ PublicKey pubKey; /* The subject key identifier extension (if any) of the last cert */ SubjectKeyIdentifierExtension subjKeyId; /* The PKIX constrained/excluded subtrees state variable */ NameConstraintsExtension nc; /* The PKIX explicit policy, policy mapping, and inhibit_any-policy state variables */ int explicitPolicy; int policyMapping; int inhibitAnyPolicy; int certIndex; PolicyNodeImpl rootNode; /* The number of remaining CA certs which may follow in the path. * -1: previous cert was an EE cert * 0: only EE certs may follow. * >0 and <Integer.MAX_VALUE:no more than this number of CA certs may follow * Integer.MAX_VALUE: unlimited */ int remainingCACerts; /* The list of user-defined checkers retrieved from the PKIXParameters * instance */ ArrayList<PKIXCertPathChecker> userCheckers; /* Flag indicating if state is initial (path is just starting) */ private boolean init = true; /* the checker used for revocation status */ RevocationChecker revChecker; /* the algorithm checker */ AlgorithmChecker algorithmChecker; /* the untrusted certificates checker */ UntrustedChecker untrustedChecker; /* the trust anchor used to validate the path */ TrustAnchor trustAnchor; /* Flag indicating if current cert can vouch for the CRL for * the next cert */ boolean crlSign = true;
Returns a boolean flag indicating if the state is initial (just starting)
Returns:boolean flag indicating if the state is initial (just starting)
/** * Returns a boolean flag indicating if the state is initial * (just starting) * * @return boolean flag indicating if the state is initial (just starting) */
@Override public boolean isInitial() { return init; }
Display state for debugging purposes
/** * Display state for debugging purposes */
@Override public String toString() { StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); sb.append("State ["); sb.append("\n subjectDN of last cert: ").append(subjectDN); sb.append("\n subjectKeyIdentifier: ").append (String.valueOf(subjKeyId)); sb.append("\n nameConstraints: ").append(String.valueOf(nc)); sb.append("\n certIndex: ").append(certIndex); sb.append("\n explicitPolicy: ").append(explicitPolicy); sb.append("\n policyMapping: ").append(policyMapping); sb.append("\n inhibitAnyPolicy: ").append(inhibitAnyPolicy); sb.append("\n rootNode: ").append(rootNode); sb.append("\n remainingCACerts: ").append(remainingCACerts); sb.append("\n crlSign: ").append(crlSign); sb.append("\n init: ").append(init); sb.append("\n]\n"); return sb.toString(); }
Initialize the state.
Params:
  • buildParams – builder parameters
/** * Initialize the state. * * @param buildParams builder parameters */
public void initState(BuilderParams buildParams) throws CertPathValidatorException { /* * Initialize number of remainingCACerts. * Note that -1 maxPathLen implies unlimited. * 0 implies only an EE cert is acceptable. */ int maxPathLen = buildParams.maxPathLength(); remainingCACerts = (maxPathLen == -1) ? Integer.MAX_VALUE : maxPathLen; /* Initialize explicit policy state variable */ if (buildParams.explicitPolicyRequired()) { explicitPolicy = 0; } else { // unconstrained if maxPathLen is -1, // otherwise, we want to initialize this to the value of the // longest possible path + 1 (i.e. maxpathlen + finalcert + 1) explicitPolicy = (maxPathLen == -1) ? maxPathLen : maxPathLen + 2; } /* Initialize policy mapping state variable */ if (buildParams.policyMappingInhibited()) { policyMapping = 0; } else { policyMapping = (maxPathLen == -1) ? maxPathLen : maxPathLen + 2; } /* Initialize inhibit any policy state variable */ if (buildParams.anyPolicyInhibited()) { inhibitAnyPolicy = 0; } else { inhibitAnyPolicy = (maxPathLen == -1) ? maxPathLen : maxPathLen + 2; } /* Initialize certIndex */ certIndex = 1; /* Initialize policy tree */ Set<String> initExpPolSet = new HashSet<>(1); initExpPolSet.add(PolicyChecker.ANY_POLICY); rootNode = new PolicyNodeImpl(null, PolicyChecker.ANY_POLICY, null, false, initExpPolSet, false); /* * Initialize each user-defined checker * Shallow copy the checkers */ userCheckers = new ArrayList<>(buildParams.certPathCheckers()); /* initialize each checker (just in case) */ for (PKIXCertPathChecker checker : userCheckers) { checker.init(false); } /* Start by trusting the cert to sign CRLs */ crlSign = true; init = true; }
Update the state with the specified trust anchor.
Params:
  • anchor – the most-trusted CA
  • buildParams – builder parameters
/** * Update the state with the specified trust anchor. * * @param anchor the most-trusted CA * @param buildParams builder parameters */
public void updateState(TrustAnchor anchor, BuilderParams buildParams) throws CertificateException, IOException, CertPathValidatorException { trustAnchor = anchor; X509Certificate trustedCert = anchor.getTrustedCert(); if (trustedCert != null) { updateState(trustedCert); } else { X500Principal caName = anchor.getCA(); updateState(anchor.getCAPublicKey(), caName); } // The user specified AlgorithmChecker may not be // able to set the trust anchor until now. for (PKIXCertPathChecker checker : userCheckers) { if (checker instanceof AlgorithmChecker) { ((AlgorithmChecker)checker).trySetTrustAnchor(anchor); } } // only create a RevocationChecker if revocation is enabled if (buildParams.revocationEnabled()) { revChecker = new RevocationChecker(anchor, buildParams); revChecker.init(false); } init = false; }
Update the state. This method is used when the most-trusted CA is a trusted public-key and caName, instead of a trusted cert.
Params:
  • pubKey – the public key of the trusted CA
  • subjectDN – the subject distinguished name of the trusted CA
/** * Update the state. This method is used when the most-trusted CA is * a trusted public-key and caName, instead of a trusted cert. * * @param pubKey the public key of the trusted CA * @param subjectDN the subject distinguished name of the trusted CA */
private void updateState(PublicKey pubKey, X500Principal subjectDN) { /* update subject DN */ this.subjectDN = subjectDN; /* update subject public key */ this.pubKey = pubKey; }
Update the state with the next certificate added to the path.
Params:
  • cert – the certificate which is used to update the state
/** * Update the state with the next certificate added to the path. * * @param cert the certificate which is used to update the state */
public void updateState(X509Certificate cert) throws CertificateException, IOException, CertPathValidatorException { if (cert == null) { return; } /* update subject DN */ subjectDN = cert.getSubjectX500Principal(); /* check for key needing to inherit alg parameters */ X509CertImpl icert = X509CertImpl.toImpl(cert); PublicKey newKey = cert.getPublicKey(); if (PKIX.isDSAPublicKeyWithoutParams(newKey)) { newKey = BasicChecker.makeInheritedParamsKey(newKey, pubKey); } /* update subject public key */ pubKey = newKey; /* * if this is a trusted cert (init == true), then we * don't update any of the remaining fields */ if (init) { init = false; return; } /* update subject key identifier */ subjKeyId = icert.getSubjectKeyIdentifierExtension(); /* update crlSign */ crlSign = RevocationChecker.certCanSignCrl(cert); /* update current name constraints */ if (nc != null) { nc.merge(icert.getNameConstraintsExtension()); } else { nc = icert.getNameConstraintsExtension(); if (nc != null) { // Make sure we do a clone here, because we're probably // going to modify this object later and we don't want to // be sharing it with a Certificate object! nc = (NameConstraintsExtension) nc.clone(); } } /* update policy state variables */ explicitPolicy = PolicyChecker.mergeExplicitPolicy(explicitPolicy, icert, false); policyMapping = PolicyChecker.mergePolicyMapping(policyMapping, icert); inhibitAnyPolicy = PolicyChecker.mergeInhibitAnyPolicy(inhibitAnyPolicy, icert); certIndex++; /* * Update remaining CA certs */ remainingCACerts = ConstraintsChecker.mergeBasicConstraints(cert, remainingCACerts); init = false; }
Returns a boolean flag indicating if a key lacking necessary key algorithm parameters has been encountered.
Returns:boolean flag indicating if key lacking parameters encountered.
/** * Returns a boolean flag indicating if a key lacking necessary key * algorithm parameters has been encountered. * * @return boolean flag indicating if key lacking parameters encountered. */
@Override public boolean keyParamsNeeded() { /* when building in reverse, we immediately get parameters needed * or else throw an exception */ return false; } /* * Clone current state. The state is cloned as each cert is * added to the path. This is necessary if backtracking occurs, * and a prior state needs to be restored. * * Note that this is a SMART clone. Not all fields are fully copied, * because some of them (e.g., subjKeyId) will * not have their contents modified by subsequent calls to updateState. */ @Override @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // Safe casts assuming clone() works correctly public Object clone() { try { ReverseState clonedState = (ReverseState) super.clone(); /* clone checkers, if cloneable */ clonedState.userCheckers = (ArrayList<PKIXCertPathChecker>)userCheckers.clone(); ListIterator<PKIXCertPathChecker> li = clonedState.userCheckers.listIterator(); while (li.hasNext()) { PKIXCertPathChecker checker = li.next(); if (checker instanceof Cloneable) { li.set((PKIXCertPathChecker)checker.clone()); } } /* make copy of name constraints */ if (nc != null) { clonedState.nc = (NameConstraintsExtension) nc.clone(); } /* make copy of policy tree */ if (rootNode != null) { clonedState.rootNode = rootNode.copyTree(); } return clonedState; } catch (CloneNotSupportedException e) { throw new InternalError(e.toString()); } } }